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Japan and loyalty to *Japan* which have been emphasized, and that a spirit of autocratic imperialism has sometimes dominated the sober sense of that nation. Therefore, let us hope that in Japan, too, those democratic elements now struggling for expression will triumph, and that those liberals who are, like Dr. Iyenaga, responsive to democratic ideals, may guide Japan's future course. Then, with the liberals of Japan and America coöperating, with the people of all the lands that border the Pacific working together to settle this issue as we are now fighting together for the same cause, let us hope that then we can at last settle this question in a way which shall make the foundation of an enduring peace.

NATIONALITY AND FREEDOM OF COMMERCE PREREQUISITES TO A DURABLE PEACE

BY STEPHEN P. DUGGAN, PH.D.,

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The Balkan problem we have had with us for over a century. It was the occasion of the present war. It will be with us in the future unless a wise solution and a solution based upon proper principles of international reorganization is followed.

Now, what are those principles of international reorganization? As Professor Brown of Princeton¹ has stated there are three principles upon which such a reorganization must be based if the reorganization is to last: the recognition of the principle of nationality; the right of nations to their own free development without being dominated by other nations; and the right of a nation to freedom of commerce with the world's markets.

The reason why the Balkan problem has been with us for over a century and has presented itself as the powder magazine of Europe for the last fifty years is because every one of those principles has been violated. The Balkans have never been permitted freedom of development because of the rival antagonisms of the great powers of Europe. For a long time Great Britain felt that in order to make secure her passage to India and her commerce to the East, it was necessary that the Straits be in the control of Turkey, and for that

¹ See page 76.

reason, Turkish control over the other Balkan states was to be maintained and Turkish misrule continued. When, after the Arabi Pasha Rebellion in Egypt in 1880, England occupied Egypt and secured control of it and thereby safeguarded her route to India, her interest in the Balkan problem waned and her demand for the maintenance of the integrity of Turkey diminished.

The void was filled at once, almost, by another group of European powers, the Central Powers—Germany and Austria-Hungary. Germany came on the international stage as a great power quite late. Looking around for colonies into which to send her surplus products, she found most of the world taken up by other powers, but she saw that there was one region that remained comparatively unexploited. That was Asia Minor, and she determined that that was to be her “place in the sun.” She must, therefore, take the place of Great Britain in dominating in Constantinople, and she took with her as her partner, Austria-Hungary. They divided up the field: Germany was to dominate in Constantinople and Asia Minor; Austria was to dominate in the Balkans. Germany did her job with efficiency. She did dominate in Constantinople and practically in Asia Minor. Austria bungled her job and only aroused increasing antagonism on the part of the Balkan nations against her.

Now, this suppression of all attempts on the part of the Balkan nations towards their own free development can only be overcome when those same Balkan nations understand that the confederation which they for one short year enjoyed and by means of which they presented a united front against any other power, should be reestablished. It may be said that that is the very thing that the Allies attempted to get the Balkan states to do at the opening of the war, to reestablish the Balkan Confederation and thereby prevent the union of Austria-Hungary and Germany with Turkey. But it must be remembered that the principles upon which the present situation in the Balkans is based were founded upon the Treaty of Bucharest which we signed at the end of the second Balkan War. That treaty violates the three principles pointed out above as the only principles upon which a true international reorganization can be based.

There is no reason, however, why those states should not confederate and present a united front. When they did in 1912, they

did it equitably. Before the first Balkan War, Serbia and Bulgaria came to an agreement and signed a treaty by means of which the only region in which there was a mixture of races, Macedonia, was divided fairly, Bulgaria getting the bigger portion. Why was that not carried out? Because again of the baleful influence of foreign domination, because Austria-Hungary was determined that Serbia should not get what she called her "window on the Adriatic," and by preventing her from doing that, compelled Serbia to look for compensation in Macedonia and to violate the agreement with Bulgaria.

Now if the nations are going to solve the problem in the Balkans at the end of the war, the principles mentioned already must be observed: the first of these is the principle of nationality. The two great principles of the French Revolution, democracy and nationality, are not yet in process of consummation because our political practice has always been about a century behind our political theory. Despite the teachings of history that you cannot suppress nations unless they are willing to be suppressed, despite the fact that for over one hundred and fifty years Poland was divided, and yet Poland is vigorous today, despite the fact that Bohemia, Ireland and other suppressed nations are problems for which statesmen seek solution today, it is probable that even at the general reorganization which comes, a solution might be attempted which will violate this principle.

If the principle of nationality were carried out what kind of a territorial reorganization would take place in the Balkans? I personally think, as the result of a good deal of study of this problem, that it is of comparatively simple solution, provided the fine ideals presented by Mr. Wilson to the world, and which are having such a splendid moral effect upon all the peoples of the world, will be followed. The trouble with the Balkans is that a large portion of each of the nations is in a free and independent state and the rest of it is under the domination and subjection of some other state, chiefly Austria-Hungary. Over eight millions of Roumanians are in free and independent Roumania, but over three millions are outside of it. There are more Serbians outside of Serbia, in such places as Bosnia and Herzegovina, than in Serbia. The majority of the Greeks, as you know, are not in Greece but in the islands and on the shores of Asia Minor in Turkish dominions.

Now if the principle of nationality were carried out in the first place, the Roumanians outside of Roumania, in Transylvania and Bukowina who are so pitilessly persecuted in Hungary, would be united to Roumania. Ideally, it would mean that Bessarabia in Russia, which is inhabited by Roumanians would also be united to Roumania. It would mean also that Roumania would restore to Bulgaria that part of Dobrudja which is a part of Bulgaria. The greater portion of this is likely to happen if the Allies win. Those portions of Austria-Hungary which Roumanian peoples inhabit will at least probably go to Roumania.

What is the second element in the reorganization? It seems to me that despite the actions of Bulgaria in 1913 and 1915—in 1913 attacking her allies and in 1915 siding with the Central powers and with her old enemy Turkey—she ought to receive the Macedonian territory that she has conquered in this war. It must be remembered that Bulgaria sees the opportunity for a greater Roumania that I have just pointed out, for a greater Serbia that I shall describe, for a greater Greece in the Aegean, but that she, hemmed in on all sides by these three, will need all the Bulgarians in a compact state to maintain her national existence.

A third element in this reorganization would be a greater Serbia, or better still, as most of the students of the problems of the Balkans believe, what would be called a United States of Ugo-Slavia or South Slavia. Every intelligent person, who has read at all on the problem of the Balkans, understands the great desire on the part of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina to be united with Serbia. Few, however, know that north of those crownlands are others, Croatia and Slavonia particularly, that are just as anxious to be united and to be free and independent. They, too, are Slavs like the Serbs. They all speak languages practically alike. They have customs alike. They are of the same race. They differ in religion, the Serbs being Orthodox, the Croatians and Slovenes being Roman Catholics, and the Austria-Hungarian policy has been pushed to the utmost to keep them divided. But the outrageous persecution of the South Slavs that began in 1909, ending in the treason trials at Agram, where the Austria-Hungary government was proved to be guilty of forged documents in order to secure the conviction of men accused of treason, has driven these two peoples together. Up to 1909, all Croatians and Slovenes and

South Slavs of Austria-Hungary wanted a union, union within the monarchy if possible, but union anyhow. Now it looks as if nothing could prevent, eventually at least, the union of all the South Slavs including Serbia and Montenegro in a great South Slav state. If history repeats itself, that consummation is inevitable. Moldavia and Wallachia, the two provinces of Roumania, when they secured their independence by the Treaty of Paris of 1856 were not permitted by the powers to unite into a single state. But they did three years later. By the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, Bulgaria was divided, but in five years the treaty was broken by the people who united themselves. If, as a result of the international reorganization which we hope is going to be based upon sound principles, these states are not united in a great South Slav state, it will only be the prelude to a movement later on whereby they will be united.

The last element in this reorganization is Greece. If the reorganization is to take place on the principle of nationality, the only Balkan state to be diminished in size is continental Greece, because that part of the territory east of the Vardar River which Greece took from Bulgaria at the end of the second Balkan War is inhabited primarily by Bulgarians and is Bulgarian in influence and ought to belong to Bulgaria. But it is to be remembered that the future of Greece is where the glory of Greece was in the classical days—it is in the Aegean Islands and on the shores of Asia Minor. It is to be remembered that in 1915, Great Britain offered Cyprus to Greece if she would come into the war on the side of the Allies. It is also to be remembered that in 1915 the greatest of the Greek statesmen, Venizelos, was willing to cede to Bulgaria the district east of the Vardar, including the town of Kavala, in the hope that Greece would get the city and province of Smyrna on the shores of Asia Minor. In other words, the solution of the Balkan problem on the principle of nationality would work again for a greater Greece, as for a greater Serbia, a greater Bulgaria and a greater Roumania.

There remains only one state in the Balkans to be considered. That is Turkey. I hope that the war will end by the Turks being put back, bag and baggage, out of Constantinople. What will become of Constantinople? Constantinople has no nationality. Of the million people in it, about half, perhaps a little less than half, are Moslems, but there is a fifth portion that are Greeks and a fifth portion Armenians, and there are a great many Jews. It is a gath-

ering of all races and nations. Now I sympathize with the desire of Russia to get to warm water. The whole policy of the past century has been dictated by that. I do not think that Russian policy has been dictated by a desire for conquest, it has been dictated by a desire for free access to warm water. It may astonish you to know that of the 20,000 miles of seacoast in Europe, Russia, which has half of the territory of Europe, has less than 2,000 of those miles, and a large portion of those 2,000 miles are icebound in winter. So I sympathize with the desire of Russia to get to warmer water.

The great dislike for Russia maintained by Scandinavia, by Norway and Sweden, has always been because of the fear that in her desire to get to warm water, she would cross them and annex them as she did Finland.

But if Russia is put in control of Constantinople, the same sack in which she was held in the past could be maintained for other states. If Russia is put in Constantinople and can at any time shut the straits, as Turkey has shut the straits to her several times, it means that the commerce of Roumania and Bulgaria, too, can be strangled.

Hence unless those two principles, one of nationality and the other of economic access for freedom of commerce, are going to be the bases of the Balkan settlement, the present war will only be a prelude to another war.

THE ECONOMIC FACTORS IN AN ENDURING PEACE

BY E. E. PRATT, PH.D.,

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The economic center of the present conflict is the struggle between Germany and the United Kingdom. These two countries represent essentially different commercial and economic systems. Great Britain, confident in the excellence of its products and in the retention of long-held markets, was slow to introduce labor-saving devices, large-scale production and efficiency methods, and was gradually finding its wares displaced, even in its own markets, by the products of less conservative nations. Germany, keenly alive to the opportunity thus created, set out to invade practically every great market of the world, with the help of the most modern appliances, the most modern methods of utilizing labor, and a very